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participated intheCJSE internationalcrisismanagementexercise intheroleof
an ethnographic researcher. An ethnographer follows the organization




The research shows how the organizational practices are premised on both
cyclicaland linear temporalities.Theorganizationappliescyclicalentrainment
practices toprovide shareddaily rhythms for theorganizationmembers,and
linearsequentialpracticestocoordinateworkflows.Furthermore,theresearch
shows how the disparity of formal documents representing past futures and
currentoperational realities representingpresent futurescancreatenetworks
ofindecisionintheorganizationhinderingtheplanningeffort.

In general, the staff organization is organized similarly to industrial
organizations: the coordination of knowledge work follows the logic of















situationawarenesshelps theorganization inbetter forecastingandeffective
planning to support the commander in leading an operation. Yet, how is
situationawareness created inanorganizational setting?Cananorganization
promote or hinder the emergence of situation awareness and how does it
happen? How does a military staff organization aim to take control of its
strategicandoperationalfuture?Thisresearcharticledelvesintotheorganizing
practices a staff organization adopts during a crisismanagement exercise. A
temporal view is adopted in the research. The study focuses on a) how
organizingactualizesinasimulatedtrainingenvironmentoverthecourseofan
exercise, b)what social practices an organization adopts to control its past,
present,andfuture,andc)howdotheformalstructureandoperatingpolicies
ofamilitaryorganization influencethewayorganizationmembersmakesense




The research observations and findings are based on an ethnographic field
studywheretheauthortookpartinaninternationalcrisismanagementtraining
exercise called Combat Joint Staff Exercise (CJSE) during 2016 and 2017. The
CJSE is an international, yearly organized event gathering over a thousand
participants from dozens of countries across the globe. In the exercise
participants hone their crisismanagement skills in a complex, simulated role
play setting supported by a sophisticated computer support system. The
simulatedtrainingenvironmentprovidesasimplified,yetanacceleratedcaseof
how an international crisismanagement operation is led by amultinational
teamofmilitaryandcivilianprofessionals.

This paper is organized in the following manner. As the CJSE provides a





a discussion of the ethnographic research method. Furthermore, the
methodologicalconsiderationsofstudyinginanexercisesettingarediscussedin
detail. After these sections, the research findings are presented via three
vignettes. Each descriptive vignette is further elaborated and analyzed via
temporality and practice theory. The key findings are summarized in the
conclusions section into observations on how leadership, organizing and
temporalitywere connectedduring the staffexercise. Thepaperendswith a
discussionsectionwhere the researchconclusionsarediscussed in relation to
thegenericorganizingprinciplesofmilitarystafforganizations.
2 
The CJSE exercise  








computer assisted simulationof amilitaryͲpolitical crisis scenariowhere they
apply and hone their operational planning and execution skills. The Finnish
Defence Forces and the Finnish Defence University are longͲstanding
participants of the exercise. The FinnishDefence Forces International Centre
(FINCENT)partakes in theplanning,executionandevaluationof theexercise.
ThisresearchreportiscommissionedbyFINCENTtobeusedinthecontinuous
development of general crisis management training in Finland and
internationally.











thepreviousexercise rounds.TheBFORHQsimulates the runningofanarmy
operationofcirca70000troops.Accordingtothegamenarrative,thesecurity
situation in Bogaland is threatened by various armed factions. The formal
Bogaland government and its troops cannot hold their ground against these
insurgent groups. Furthermore, a powerful neighboring country (Neland) is
showingstrategicinteresttowardstheBogalandareaandhasbecomemilitarily
active in the region. The gamers therefore face multiple, widely dispersed
challenges in the operation, where they need to both enforce peace in
Bogaland, dealwith and disarm the various armed factions operating in the
region and react to the increasing military threat presented by a powerful














Site Uppsala Site Karlskrona Site Enköping
but also the various other stakeholders (e.g. political, humanitarian) are
includedinthedecisionͲmakingaction1.

Thesimulation includesparticipants inthreegenericroles.Thegame isrunby
anorganizationofgameplanners(JEC),whoplan,constructandexecutevarious
game incidents in thegameenvironment.Mostof theseare injected into the
game via the computerenvironment,however, there are also incidentswere
liveroleplayingscenesareconducted.Thebiggestgroupofparticipantsarethe
actual trainees, i.e. those who assume a position in the one of the BFOR
operationstafforganizationsandwho‘roleplay’theirtasksandresponsibilities
intheorganization.Theplayerstypicallyhaveprevioustraininginstafffunctions
from theirhome countries and/orpractical experienceofworking in real life
peacekeeping operations. The gamers’ military ranks vary from captains to




assessors (OTTM, EXEVAL). Individuals in these roles observe and guide the
playersduring theexercise,providinghelp to those inneed.Theyalso return






in green. In addition, the picture shows how the organizations are physically
located on three different sites across Sweden. In picture 2 the Land







































The pictures reveal that a crisis management organization is functionally
organized. Themore generic picture (picture 1) shows that the components
havetheirdedicatedstafforganizations.Thesecondpicture(picture2)reveals
how tasks and responsibilities are functionally distributed within the land
component. Land Component’s (LCC) part of the operation is led by a
commander (COM), who is supported by the chief of staff (COS) who is in
charge of the LCC staff organization. Further, the LCC exercise organization
consistedofvariousbranches(G2:intelligence,G3:operations(shortterm),G4:





where these teams have their responsibilities divided based on a temporal
segregation: theG2 branch is responsible for planning activities that require
immediate,dayͲtoͲdayreaction(0Ͳ48hours),theG3’sresponsibility liesonthe
near future (some days, typically 2Ͳ10 days), and the G5 branch takes
responsibility foractivitieshavinga longer time frame (from twoweeks tosix
months). Issuesand incidents thathappen in theworld, simulatedor real,do
not typicallyhavea ‘BestBefore’stampbut theirtemporalrelevance isbased
onsomebody’ssubjectiveassessmentofanincident’scharacter:itisnotalways
easytoestimatewhetheranemerging issuehasrelevanceontheshortorthe
long term, on both terms, or no relevance at all. Military operations are




manages thedivisionof labor inworkprocessesandnegotiatesandorganizes
thetasksandresponsibilitiesintheflowofcontinuouseventsintheeverydayof
the (simulated) peaceͲkeeping operation. I shall delve into this theme in the
empiricalsectionofthispaper.

In addition to having the prescribed command structure, the organization
engages in the running of various crossͲorganizational processes. These
individual tasksandwiderprocessesaremanagedaccording toNorthAtlantic
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) protocols, procedures and standard operating
procedures (SOPs).  For the international participants, the NATO SOPs and
terminology with its plethora of acronyms and specialized military jargon
provides the shared operational platform and a ‘common language’.  The
organizationmemberswork crossͲorganizationally in various teams and task
groupsthroughouttheexercise.

RESEARCH FOCUS  
Duringmy firstobservationday,anexperiencedOTTMofficer toldme thata
wellͲworkingstafforganizationkeepsitself“aheadofthings”.Acompetentstaff
officerneedstobeabletoscreenhugeloadsofincominginformation,pickthe
relevant informationand reacton itaccordingly. According to thisofficer, to
succeedastafforganizationneedstohavefreecapacityavailableatalltimesto
be able to react to unexpected situations. In an unrelated incident,midway
through the exercise, the LCC chief of staff (COS) addressed the staffwith a










These kinds of individual and collective capabilities are vital insights in any





under the heading of situation awareness (Endsley, 1995; Lundberg, 2015)3.
Accurate andupͲtoͲdate situation awareness is required topierce the Fogof
War. According to Hanska (2017: 122) in the past the bottleneck inmilitary
decisionͲmakingwas the acquirement and transmissionof information to the
commander.DuringthecurrentInformationAge,thebottleneckliesinanalysis
andunderstandingofthehugequantityof informationavailable.Eventhough
advances in information technology boost the processing of available
information, the human element still acts as a critical factor in the decisionͲ
makingcycle.Situationawarenessisthekeyelementintheseprocesses.

Situation awareness (SA) is used to refer to a) a statewhere these kinds of
insights are internalized in individuals and social groups, b) to technical and
organizationalsystemsusedtoenhanceSA,ortoc)theprocessthroughwhich
these insights are individually and organizationally gained (Lundberg, 2015).
Such insightshave concrete value to anorganization. For example, a relative
advantageinsituationawarenessallowsacombatanttogetinsidetheenemy’s
OODAloop(ObserveͲOrientͲDecideͲAct)(Coram,2002)givinghimacompetitive
edge inmaking quicker and better decisions and gaining an upper hand in
influencing the combat situation, i.e. ‘creating the combat context’. In the




objectives, risks and other contextual elements to be effectively used in
decisionͲmaking. In such processes individuals and groups can be seen to





the individual situation awareness skill set and train organizations to ‘see
beyond the current situation or setting’. Yet, how is this actualized in an





throughout human history4. Both individual experts and organizations are
knowntobenotoriouslybadatmakingaccuratepredictionsofwhatthefuture
brings. Another recognized feature of organizational life is that despite their
stated efforts to focus on visionary leadership and future strategizing,
organizationsusemostoftheirtimeandeffort inreactingtoandtacklingwith
the problems of the present (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Alvesson &
Svenningsson,2003;Holmberg&Tyrstrup,2010).  Suchdevelopmentsmight
also ailmilitary organizations, as, according to an OTTM officer interviewed
duringtheexercise,arecurrentsituation isthatstaffresourcesaretransferred




In this research paper, Iwill focus on the practices throughwhich the staff
organizationaimstoincreaseitssituationawarenessofthetemporalfuture.My
focus is not on individual level cognition, but on the social practices the
organization adopts and applies in coordinating its future planning.
Furthermore, this research paper does not aim to isolate a ‘blueprint for
success’ or to compile a list of ‘best practices for Situation Awareness
enhancement’,butratheritdiscussesthechallengesandproblemsthatemerge
when people in the staff organization attempt to learn to ‘know the future’
insidethefunctionallyorganizedhierarchy. Iwillobserveanddiscusstheways
thecurrenthierarchyandtheStandardOperatingProcedures (SOPs) influence
people’s SA and how the organization tries to copewith its structure in the
attempttolearnto‘keepaheadofthings’.

In the next chapter, theoretical concepts and views that are relevant tomy
analysisoftemporalityinthestafforganizationarepresented.

TEMPORALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS 
Themostcommonviewoftimeincontemporary,westernorganizationsrelates
toclocktime.Clocktime,orchronologicaltime,referstoaperceptionoftimeas
objective (existing independently of us), unitary (subject to only one
interpretation),linear(progressingsteadilyfromthepastviapresenttofuture),
and mechanical (consisting of discrete moments subject to precise
measurement). Clock time, through its objective, measurable quality, helps
organizations tremendously toorganize things: toschedule, toset timetables,
deadlines,toresourceactivities, tocoordinateactivitiesetc.Clock time isalso

4 For example, in ancient Babylon Barûtu diviners read omens from the entrails of sheep.
During the Roman empire, augurs interpreted thewill of gods from the flight of birds. In
modern times, the techniques of forecasting consist of the emplotment of (mostly linear)
trendsofpastandpresentdatatothefuture.Budgetingmayprovideanillustrativeexampleof
this: inmanyorganizationsbudgeting ismanagedbyprocuring lastyear’snumbersandthen
addingafewpercentagestocomeupwiththisyear’sbudget.
8 
inherently connected to productivity (Bluedorn& Denhardt, 1988: 303). The
concept of productivity is based on concepts of resource inputs, produce
outputsandthespeedthroughwhichsuchtransformationsoccur.Gulick(1987:
116)concludedthat“inmanagementthebasicelementsare:timeasaninput,




onthetimepeoplespend inworkactivity.  Theclocktimeviewoftimewasa





MaxWeber (1947), does not include a time dimension. In the bureaucratic
organization system, time has no relevance: bureaucracy is about making
accuratedecisions,andthetime ittakestoreachdecision isnotan important
aspect from an organization’s point of view (even if it typically has huge
difference toabureaucracy’s client…).Yet,most contemporaryorganizations,
militaryorganizations included, stillbase their logicof actiononbureaucratic
principles and the tayloristic ideas of productivity. The contemporary
organizations are formalized into hierarchical (timeless) structures and









which isbasedon repetitionofeventsandpausesbetween suchevents.We
associate meaning with important events and use them to structure our
existenceintoacoherentwhole.Wegiveordertoourlivesbyprovidingitwith
patterns,both individuallyandorganizationally (Gell,1992).When thesurface
of any linear progress story is scratched,we recognize how it has actualized
through various organizational practices,where organizations and individuals
perform routinized, sometimeseven ritualizedactivities in yearlyorquarterly
cycles.Thetimeframesareentangled,wherethecyclical,repeatedactivities,i.e.
practicesareexpectedtoproducealinearlydevelopingorganizationandtheyin








The previous paragraphs show how organizing is simultaneously rooted on
different temporal framesofreference. Inrealityorganizationsadoptmultiple
timesystemssimultaneously,andpeopleinorganizationsevoketheseframesof
reference according to their sensemaking needs. Furthermore, different
cultures and collectives have constructed differing ways of relating to time
systems.  For example, Hall (1983) examined time as an invisible language
employed differently in different cultures. He distinguished between
monochronic and polychronic approaches to organizing time. Monochronic
referstoanapproachwhereeventsarescheduledasseparateitems–onething
atatime–whereaspolychronicreferstoanunderstandingthatpeoplemaybe







perspective present an extremely difficult problem in terms of social
integration.Differentcultures,evendifferentclassesorgroupswithincultures,
move with different rhythms and with different temporal perspectives
(Bluedorn & Denhardt, 1988: 301). In the CJSE setting, where people come
together from different national cultures, professional cultures (military vs.
civilian), and military branches (navy, army, air force, engineers etc.), it is
predictable thatpeopleneed timeandeffort tobecomeawareof thevarious
temporalitiesguidingtheircounterparts’actions.TheCJSEcanbeclassifiedasa
temporally asymmetric organization (Zerubavel, 1981) where various groups




Another field of inquiry involving time in organizational studies relates to




the longest tasks may take even decades to complete. Jaques argued that
different individuals,withdifferentcapabilities,are required toundertake the
tasks that involve longer time spans. Thiswould imply that strategicmilitary
plannersarerequiredtobeabletoidentify,describeandassessorganizational
andenvironmentalchangeanddevelopmentover long time frames.Research
has shown that managers who are guided to think about past events,






futureperfect tense isaway to thinkabout the future like thepastand thus
provide more detail about it, improving planning. Yet, future challenges
organizations face can be either recurring or unique. Peopleworking in the
fashion industry are expected to be able to anticipate the trends of the




time:a)asanobjective, independent featureof theworld,measurableusing
naturalsciencemethod,andb)asasubjectiveexperienceoftheworld,intrinsic
to a sentient organizational actor. Both perspectives are important to our
exploration of the temporalities in organizing and need to be discussed in a
more abstract fashion. PhilosopherMcTaggart (1927) identified twoways of
talking about time: objectively, by differentiating between earlier and later
states;andsubjectively,byimplicatingtheobserverintheanalysis.Hesuggests
that events are conceptualized in timewhere the relation between them is
defined in apermanent and absoluteway. To illustrate, if eventXhappened
before event Y, then X will always be earlier than Y. Thus, Rome collapsed
beforeUnitedStateswas foundedorpeopleareyoungbefore theygrowold.





surrounding relations. Tensed statements are fundamentally contextͲ
dependent and therefore they are inherently relative, impermanent, and
associatedwithchangeandtemporality.Inthissense,theobservers’narrations
are bound with their personal, collective and societal pasts, presents and
futures. Bergmann (1981) points out that all human societies differentiate
criteria related tobothAͲand theBͲ seriesof time.Membersofall societies
distinguishbetweenevents that arehappeningnow,have takenplace in the
past,ormightpossiblyoccur in the future.Weknowpasteventsby records,
perceivepresentonesdirectly,andknow futureones inour imaginationonly
(Adam,1990).

Henri Bergson (1910) used the concept ‘presencing’ to express continual
creationofthepresent.Accordingtohistheoryoftime,thepastandfutureare
not just bound by memory and intent: they are constantly created and
recreatedinthepresent.Evenwhiletheeventsofthepastareundoable,inits
meaningandthewayitispreserved,evoked,andselected,thepastisrevocable
and as hypothetical as the future. The past is continuously recreated and
11 
reformulatedintoadifferentpastfromthestandpointoftheemergentpresent.
Emergence inevitably reflects into the past and changes itsmeaning (Mead,
1932/2002).AsimpleexampleofthisistheupdatingoftheCurriculumVitae–
practice required fromacademic researchersaspartofa fundingapplication.
ManyresearcherstakepainstorewritetheirCVsforthedifferentfunderseven
insituationswheretheircurrentpositionhasnotchanged,ortheyhavenonew
publications.Researchersrewrite theirCVstoemphasizecertain facetof their
careers,believedtoberelevanttothe fundingparty. InrewritingourCVs,we
also rewrite our histories with the aim of convincing the funder that an
investmentinuswouldbeasafebetinthefuture.

Similarly, amilitary plan as a construction extends to both the past and the
future from the present. In strategies and plans continuity and change,
conservation and revolution interpenetrate. Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013)
studiedthepracticesthroughwhichstrategists inatechnologycompanymade
projectionsaboutthefutureoftheirbusiness.Theseactorsengagedinproblem
solving efforts in the present; identifying the problems at hand, making
decisions,andtakingaction.Theresearchersobservedhowtheprojectionsinto
the future (both diagnoses of possible trajectories and potential resolutions)
were critically shaped by the strategists’ reconstructions of the past. The
strategists drew on their repertoires of past experience and these
interpretations guided theirattentionand shaped their interpretationsof the
situation.Therefore,whenmakingdecisionsinthepresenttoprojectsomething
into the future, we draw from our memories of the past. In our common
thinking we think of the past in terms of truthfulness: whether something
happened iseithertrueorfalse,andaboutthefutureaspossibilities:anything
can happen (Gell, 1992: 253). Yet, as the phenomenologists have argued
(Bergson, 1910; Mead, 1932/2002; Schütz, 1932), and the contemporary
organizational research empirically observed (Brunninge, 2009; Kunisch,
Bartunek,Mueller& Huy, 2017), this past is asmalleable as the future. So,
paradoxically, strategies; imaginative constructsof adesired future state, are
grounded on the past. The history of an organization, the capabilities it has
developedandacquiredsetconstraintsonwhatstrategistsseeasachievablefor
anorganization inthefuture.Still,history isnotsolelyaconstraint, it isalsoa
resourceenabling futureͲmaking. Organizational strategistshavebeen shown
to purposefully use reconstructions of history to guide strategyͲmaking
(Brunninge, 2009), identity (Anteby & Molnar, 2012), and organizational
adaptation and change (Coraiola et al. 2017; Suddaby & Foster, 2017).
Strategists acknowledge the history of the organization, the incremental
development path on which the organization has progressed towards the




ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH PROCESS 
The research behind this research paper was conducted using ethnographic




familiarwith theeveryday life inanorganization,observe theeventsas they
unfold,discusstheirrelevancewiththemembersofthecollectiveandreflecton
his findings and conclusions. The primary data collection methods in an
ethnographicstudyconsistofobservation,participationanddiscussions,ofboth
formaland informalnature,heldwith theorganizationmembers. Ina typical
ethnographicstudythisdatacollectionphasetakesa lotoftime. Ittakestime
fortheresearchertobecomeacquaintedwiththeorganizationmembers,and
for the organization members to become accustomed to the researcher.
Ethnography is a holistic research approach: the researchermakes extensive
fieldnotesduringhisstaywiththeorganization,writingdownobservationsand
makingearly interpretationsof thephenomenahewitnesses.The researcher
may discuss his observations and interpretations with the organization
members,gainingmore indepthunderstandingoftheculturalpracticesofthe
organization inquestion.Theanalyticprocess,which follows theprinciplesof
the interpretativeresearchparadigm (Hatch&Yanow,2003;Prasad&Prasad,
2002; Burrell&Morgan, 1979), continues after the field study phase as the
researchercontinuestorelatehisobservationstopreviousresearch,theorizing
hisfindingsandreflectingonhisobservationsand initial interpretations. Inhis
research reporting, the researcher typically describes his observations and









visitor. During this oneͲweek visit, I visited the three exercise siteswith the
FINCENT officersmanaging the exercise andwas able towidely observe the
exercise grounds and practices. During this first field trip I did not explicitly
collect organizational material for research purposes but limited myself to
writingpersonalnotesofmyobservations.Afterthisphase,Icraftedaresearch
plan to study the many facets of temporality in the exercise context. This
researchplanwasformallysanctionedbyFINCENTandtheexerciseorganizing




During the first day of the 2017 field study I negotiated with my client
representatives and the other researchers taking part in the exercise about
whichorganizationwouldbest fillmyrequirements fordatacollection.During















barracks at 0745. Iwould spend the day in the LCC staff building joining in
meetings, strollingaround, talkingwithdifferentpeople, sittingby the coffee
machines, and typing notes on my computer. It took me a day or two to
familiarizemyselfwiththedailymeetingsandbriefsintheLCCandtomakeup
mymindaboutwhatrepetitiveevents Iwould follow. Icametopayattention
especially theCommander’sUpdateBriefs (CUB),OTTMmeetings,variousG3
andG5meetings,andtheChiefofStaff’s(COS)updatebrief.Attimes,Iwould
have individualmeetingswith variouspeople takingpart in theexercise.The
lunch and the dinner provided importantmilestones during the days, and I
typically searched for a familiar face in the dining quarters to complement
eating with discussion. The exercise day would end circa 2015Ͳ2030 with a










organization. I had become entrained to the staff organization. Entrainment
refers toanorganizationalprocesswhere the“paceorcycleofoneactivity is
adjusted to match or synchronize with another activity” (Ancona & Chong,
1996:251).Entrainmentcanappearbetweenanindividualandanorganization,




it felt as if I was doing something noteworthy, even when no one in the
organizationknew indetailwhat Iwasdoing.  Inoticedhow thesmalldetails
startedstickingwithme, like Icame to recognizedifferentnationalitiesbased
onthecamouflagetextureoftheiruniforms.Therhythmseemedtoprovideme
witha senseof security:even if Ididnotknowwhether the research results
wouldaccount toanything, Iwasat leastdoingmywork in linewithhowmy
focalorganizationwasoperating.

I kept a research diary during the exercise. I wrote daily memos where I
describedmy observations, short transcripts ofmy discussions with various
people and research ideas and hypotheses. The length of thememos varied
between600and2200words.Allinall,mynotesduringtheexerciseconsisted
of9500words.Ialsoappliedforaspecialpermittophotographtheevent.After
thepermitwasgranted I tookapproximately20photosasmy researchdata.
Due to security reasons,noelectronicmaterialwasallowed tobe taken from
theexercise. Ihadaccess to theexercise IT systemsandhadpermit toprint
exercisematerialtobeusedinresearch.Allinall,Iprintedcirca50documents
from various forums and teams in the exercise. Thismaterial rounds up to
approximately 500Ͳ600 pages of material (Excel sheets, Word documents,







andanthropological literatureontemporality. Inaddition, Ifamiliarizedmyself
withsomemilitaryliterature,especiallyonoperationalart,militarystrategyand
tactics. Iused these literatures tomake senseofmy field study findings and
used the chosen theoriesandarguments to consolidatemyexplanative story
(Dyer&Wilkins,1991).
Military exercise as a research setting  
ItneedstobeacknowledgedthateveniftheCJSEisahugeevent,itstillisonly
an exercise. This exercise setting influences the research process and the
findings.Thegeneralizationoftheresearchfindings isdiscussed inmoredetail
inthediscussionchapter,butinthissection,Idiscusstheexerciseasaresearch
context.All inall, theexerciseaims to train thepeople fora role inanactual
military campaign. The exercise is a training event, and the participants are
there to learn about their possible future tasks and roles. Majority of the
exercise participants have not held a similar role to what they train for.
Therefore, they cannot be considered ‘hardy veterans’ in their staff tasks. In
addition, the exercise organization is ramped up very quickly and the
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organizationmembersarealmost immediatelyrequired to identify theirroles,
responsibilities and tasks and cooperatewith other organizational units and
members. Furthermore, most of the people do not know their immediate
colleagues beforehand. Even further, the exercise lasts only for a week,





other, theyhaveonly cursoryunderstandingof theevents thathavebrought
theexercisenarrative to its current state,and theyknow thataftera10Ͳday
period the eventwill be over. The organization needs to be brought into a
working status very quickly (in a day) to provide a satisfactory training
experience. These features were clearly recognized by the game organizers,
mentorsandplayers.Furthermore,thesimulatedtrainingexercisesettingwas
evoked to by the participants as an explanation especially when the
organizationwasnotworkingas itshouldbe. Ihadmultiplediscussionswhere







However, the fastpaceof theexerciseand itsnovelty to theparticipantsalso




morequickly than in real lifeduring theexercise, yet thismayalso influence
peoples’ perceptions of their tasks, responsibilities and the game setting. As
peoplejointheexerciseforonlyaweek,andthenmoveonwardstoothertasks,
itmaybethatpeopledonothaveaproperpossibilityorincentivetoassessthe
game situation long term. It isprobable that the staffofficers inAfghanistan,
wheresomecampaignshavenow lastedfor16years,adoptamore longͲterm
perspectiveontheevolutionoftheoperationthaninansimulatedexercisewith
a long textualevolutionnarrative,butonlyaweek’sperformance. Still, I feel
thatthephenomenathatareimportantforthisanalysisarenottobeassessed
solelybasedonthesecontextualfactors.Ibelievetheywillrevealgeneralizable







FINDINGS   

























repeated itself almost identically every day during the exercise. The
Commander’s Update Brief (CUB) was held at exactly the same time every
morning and it lasted between 25Ͳ30 minutes. This repetitive, cyclical
temporalitycreatedstructureandmeaning inthedaily lifeofthestaffofficer.
Thebriefactedasa temporalmilestoneamong theeveryday routinesof the
organization.Whilemoststaffteamshadalreadybeguntheirdailyworkbefore
the morning brief, the majority of the LCC staff members organized their
timetables so that they could take part in the CUB. During the brief the
audiencewouldhearthevariousstafffactionspresenttheiroperationalstatus
reports to the commander and witness the commander’s questions and




5 Bravo time refers to local Swedish time (Central European Time, CET). Zulu timewas a
conceptused to refer toGreenwichMeanTime (GMT).Zulu timeasa concept isespecially









leading to theentrainmentofdailyorganizationalactivities (Ancona&Chung,
1996;Bluedorn&Jaussi,2008).Whilethevariousindividualsandteamsinthe
LCCorganizationhadtheirownschedulesofvariousbriefs,meetingsandbreaks
for the day and the week, they were mostly subsidiary to a more general
schedule, called ‘The Battle Rhythm’ and the CUB was themost important
individualpieceinit.ItisimportanttorecognizethattheLCCdailyschedulewas
not static:everyevening theBattleRhythmwas tweakedand refined for the
coming day in the COS coordination meeting, yet the CUB schedule was
considered sacred; it would not be tampered with. The CUB created a
convergingpointofreferenceforthestaffmembers;bothcognitively,physically
and temporally. The participants would accompany the same brief as the
commanderandnoticehisinterests,andthiswouldhappeninthesharedspace
at a regular time.After thebrief, the staffmemberswould disperse to their
individualdutiesacrosstheLCCandotherstafforganizations.

The organizational everyday builds from routines and practices, such as the
CUB. Such routines can be regarded as the primary means by which
organizations accomplishmuch ofwhat they do (Feldman& Pentland, 2003:
94). In themilitary, the staff officers’ role is about planning, either crafting
strategicplans foranoperationorplanningonhow toexecuteacertain task.
Theworkingdayincludesinformationgathering,analysis,anddissemination.On
a more practical level, the work includes reading, oneͲonͲone discussions,
meetings,preparationsofvariousmessages,reportsandpresentations.Inother
words,theworkconsistsmostlyofreading,writingandtalking.Thetoolsused
in the work consisted of various IT systems, email, telephone, forms and
manuals, excel sheets,word documents and powerpoint presentations. I, an
organizationalscholarwhohasworkedearlierwithpublicsectorandbusiness

6 The timeͲrelatedbehaviors are an important facetof commander’s leadership. They take










and to be held in high regard. These temporal routines not onlymanifest and repeat the
leadershipstatushierarchy,theyalsoenhanceandsustainit.
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organizations, was a bit startled by the commonalities between the staff






The trainingexerciseaims to train theparticipants in theiroccupational roles
andresponsibilities.Therolesareadoptedviatheparticipationinthepractices
carriedout in theorganization.Thepracticesoffer theparticipantsmodelsof
whattheworkisallaboutandhowtoperformiteffectively.Boththetechnical
skills and the identities of the professional soldiers are adopted through this
kindofaction.Thepracticesarenotindividual,theyaresocial.Forexample,the
CUB is a social practice that requires the presence of the presenters, the
commanderandtheaudience tobecome theritual it is.Practicesalsoevolve,
theydonot stay the same (Feldman&Pentland,2003).Thepresentershone
theirskills,adoptingthesociallyexpectedsuaveandsuccinctstyle.TheCUBasa
practicehas, inadditiontofacilitatingthecreationofacollectiveawareness,a
leadershipelement. In thesymbolicperformanceof theCUB,both leaderand
follower rolesareclaimedandgrantedby theparticipants (DeRue&Ashford,
2010).During the CUB, the role of the commander as the ultimate decisionͲ










Planning teams attempting to take control of their allocated futures  
Thefirstdayoftheexerciseischaracterizedbyindividualactivityandcollective
disorganization.People spend a lotof time reading the trainingmanuals and
SOPs inordertorecognizetheirindividualrolesandtasks.Teamsassemblefor
the first time, people familiarize themselveswith their colleagues and try to
makeandgivesensetotheircollectivetaskduringtheexercise.Inthisactivity,
the linear interpretation of time became dominant in peoples’ minds: the
ramping up of the organization takes time. The early process is hindered by
various glitches: meetings are doubleͲbooked, people do not know which






withmultiple rolesareexpected tobe simultaneously in severalplaces.After
the internalorganizingof the teamsstartstoproduceacoherentpattern,the
focusmoves to interͲteamcoordination.Thisphase starts toemergemoreor
lessduringthesecondexerciseday.Coordinationacrosscomponents,upwards
with BFOR HQ, or downwards with the brigade would take even longer to
appear. It is this microlevel organizing: the allocation of people and tasks,
schedulingof individualmeetings that is required for the totalorganization to
start functioning. During the first days, thiswork required a lot of effort as
everythingwasneededtobecoordinatedforthefirsttime.Duringthefollowing
days,theamountofthisdaily,microlevelorganizingeffortlessenedsomewhat,
yet never ceased totally. Various changes were required every day and the
organizationhadtoreacttothemoverandoveragain.Everydetailcannotbe
derived from the SOPs: people have tomeet, check, recheck and coordinate
theirindividualtimetablesonhowandwhenaretheygoingtoworkoncertain
details toproduce a routinized larger organization. The seemingly stable and
structuredorganization therefore requiresconstantmicroleveladaptationand
effort from the organizationmembers on every hierarchical level.When one
looksfromacloserange,theseeminglystaticorganizationisreorganizingitself
constantly (Weick & Quinn, 1999). During the first days I heard people
lamentingabout thenumberofmeetings theywere required to takepart in.
The familiar point raised at this stagewas: “When am I supposed to do the




Interestingly, simultaneouslyas theorganizing starts to form, italso starts to
erode.Peoplearemoved,inaseeminglyadhocfashion,tonewpositionsacross
theorganization.A liaisonofficer Iwas talking toduring the firstexerciseday
was transferred to a new position on the Uppsala site during the second
exerciseday.Laterduringtheweek,ateamleaderwasexplainingtomehowhe








teamof the LCC.This teamwas formally allocated responsibility for the long
termplanningwithinthe landcomponent: fromtwoweekstosixmonths into







theG5 team,and theyassembledacrossͲorganizational team fromotherLCC
teamrepresentativestoproducetheassessment.

TheLCCG5wasnot theonly team in theorganization supposed topeek into
thisparticular temporalhorizon.Other teams,ondifferenthierarchical levels,
were also supposed to focus on the same future frame. Higher up in the
hierarchya long rangeplanning taskwasallocated toBFORHQ J5 team,and
lowerdown inthehierarchytheresponsibility laywithbrigade levelG5team.
Crucial,however,wouldbethecoordinationandlinkingoftheteams’planning
activitiesacrossthetotalorganization.TheSOPsprovidedtheguidinglogicon
how the coordination should unfold. The fundamental bureaucratic and
scientific management principles of hierarchy, linearity and sequentiality




the operation, component level should confirm that the organization had
adequateresources to fill thatpurpose,and thebrigade levelshould focuson
themeansoftheoperation.Thismodeofoperationhasastrongattachmentto
thelogicofindustrialproductionplanning:firstsettheobjectives,thenprocure
the resources and lastly define the action steps. However, this industrial
paradigm logic carried also another premise that wasn’t too fitting to the
knowledgeworkathandintheorganization:theprincipleofirreversibility.

During the exercise the ideawas that thework done byBFOR level J5 team




premises for their dedicated planningwork. Yet, things did not roll like this
during this exercise. As the teams began their work simultaneously at the
beginningof theexerciseweek, the sequencingofplanningdidnothappen9.
Rather,theworkwasparallel.ThemembersoftheLCCG5teamgrewanxious
when the linear idea of the sequential waterfall model did not work.
Furthermore,feedbackfromthebrigadelevelrevealedthattheLCCwasunable
toprovidetherequired informationdownwards intheorganization.Theteam
members were uncertain about their tasks, they questioned themselves

9 Ididhear that therewas someBFOR level long rangeplanning alreadydoneduringpreͲ
trainingphase,butapparentlyitdidnotcarrytheplanningworkfarenoughtobeableprovide
component level team with a confirmed basis of action. I was also told that the Finnish
nationalpracticeistostartsimilarexercisesearlierforhigherlevelplanningteams.ThissetͲup
lessensthewaitingandambivalenceduringtheexercise.Yet,suchpracticedoesnotquestion
whether there are challenges in organizing knowledge processes as if they werematerial
manufacturingprocesses.
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whether they were doing “somebody else’s work” in the organization and
whether thework done in a less coordinated fashionwould be overlapping
ratherthansupplementary.Laterduringtheweek,forexample,oneoftheG5
officerswasexplainingtomehowseveralplanningteamswere“tryingtotake
control” of the Gotland operation producing unwanted complexity. The
“ownership of the future”was therefore ambivalent in the organization. The
teams had hesitations to actwhen theywere lacking formal guidelines and
structure, even whenmajority of the information used in the planning was
available.

From my perspective, the most interesting aspect in this ‘organizational
malfunction’was thestrongenforcementofsequentialityand irreversibility in
the teams’action.The teammembersweresocialized intohearing from their




ebband flowacross thehierarchical levelsor componentswhere the ‘tideof
information’ would run from that party best prepared to those coming in
behindespeciallybeforedecisionmakingphases.Concurrentplanningpractices
did not emerge beyond the component boundaries. This happened partly
becausetheteamsseemedtoadoptaninstrumentalratherthanasubstantive
rationalitystance(Weber,1947):havingyourplanformallyacceptedandclosed
carriedmoreweight thanwhatwas actually stated in the plan. This stance
enforced the sequential and irreversible organizational logic integral to the
planningprocess.

This problem of ‘planning teams stuck in limbo’was recognized by both the






meetingwas a formal J5presentation given to theBFOR commander and50
other interested parties. No actual possibility for questions or comments
appeared. TheG5 team leader commented themeeting tomeby saying: “It
seems thatwehavenowdoneparallel rather thansupplementarywork.”This
episode further enhanced the feeling that the G5 teamwas lostwithin the








commentators, this practice is used in the Swedish national exercises. The
componentlevelwouldthenproduceitsownplans,withlesslinkagewithjoint
level planning. In other words, organizationally the joint level and the
componentlevelwereexpectedtobetightlycoupled,yettheyendedupbeing
onlylooselycoupled(Weick,1995).Duringthefinaldayoftheexercise,inthe
G5 planning team closingmeeting, the sentiment in the teamwas that the
topics they had been planning onwere now owned by another team in the
organization.My assessmentwas that theambivalence related to the team’s





One particular reasonwhy the coordination of the future planning activities
according to the waterfall model did not work very well in the BFOR




Furthermore, it needs to recognized that cooperation practices across the
componentandhierarchical levelsweretheveryslowesttoappear.Themore
distant people are from each other physically and organizationally, the less
likelytheyaretocommunicateandcooperate(Rogers&Kincaid,1981).Infact,
itwas apparent from the beginning that theG5 planning taskwould not be
finalizedduringtheexercise,andthiscanbeseentoaddtotheambivalencein
the team’swork. The exercise setting directed the teams to hurry inmaking
future plans they would see neither finalized nor actualized as part of the
operation.Theneedforconcurrentplanningpracticeswasveryevidenttothe
participants,however, theSOPsor theorganizational structure ingeneraldid
notsupportnorenforcetheiradoption.

However, rather than focus on the teams’ performances in this particular
exercise, Iammorepronetodrawattentiontothecognitiveblueprintbehind
theoperatingprocedures.Thefutureplanningfollowedalogicthatisdescribed
in strategic management as the classic planning school where strategy is
perceived as the outcome of linear sequential activities of analysis,
development and implementation (Mintzberg& Lampel, 1999). Thiswas the
dominant logic applied by the teams during the exercise. Yet, strategy
constitutesmuchmorethan justplanningactivity.Mintzberg(1994:24)wrote
that“organisationsplanforthefutureandtheyalsoevolvepatternsoutofthe
past”. Strategy can also be considered as a pattern that emerges over time
based on experimentation and discussion (Paroutis, Heracleous & Angwin,
2013:4).However,withintheCJSEactivitiesrelatedtothepastortheevolution
of the campaign were mostly ignored. The planning practices kept the
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participants’ focus tightlyon thepresent andnear future challenges. Far less




The tricky convergence of past documents, present action, and future 
plans  
The primary task and function of themilitary staff organization is to aid a
militarycommanderincontrollingthecomplexityrelatedtotheadministration





of themilitary staff organization. Tomanage it, the staff organizations have
developed theiroperationalproceduresand functions toprocess thecomplex
entanglementsof intelligencedata,capabilities, resources,schedulingand the
likes.

The stafforganization’s impact isbest revealedvia the tangibleoutputsof its
work: the documents containing the various plans and orders used to
communicatethecommander’s intentionsandwilltotheresponseforces.The
CJSE staff organization produces huge amounts of documents daily. The
documents constitute an elaborate system of coded information and
knowledge. Furthermore, a document begins to age the verymoment it is
produced.Whereas events have dates, documents, asmaterial objects, have










The planning and assessment processes are very much dependent on the
organizationaldocumentation.Itcouldbeevenarguedthatitisthedocuments
andtheofficerstogetherthatconstitutetheactorswhoareexpectedtoactina
collective (Latour, 2005: 75; Cooren, 2004). The teams use the documents




being enforcedduring the current exercisebynewpeople. Furthermore, this
means that in the process of conducting their tasks the current teams
continuouslyengageincognitiveworkthataimstomakethesedocumentsand




does theword ‘initiate’actuallymean?’, the team reacted to thiswitha tired









The success and failure of a crisis management operation and its general
progress ismeasuredagainsta systemofordersanddecisive conditions.The
variousplansandordersconstituteahierarchy,wheretheconcept‘plan’isused
todescribe longer term intentsandactivitiesand the concept ‘order’ shorter
termobjectivesandactions. Forexample, theCJSE long rangeplansdescribe
thedesiredend stateof the total crisismanagementoperation, consistingof
criteria such as a) democratically elected,working government is in effect in
Bogaland;andb)thecountryholdsaneffectivemilitaryandpoliceforcethatis
able to keep peace and protect the civilian population in the country10. This
levelofplanningisactualizedontheBFORHQandSTRATCOMlevel.Theseplans




Coordination Orders (LCO). Furthermore, the system of orders also includes
short term orders called Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO) that are used to
communicate changes in the earlier, higher level orders or to cover amore
limited operational activity. In practice, these plans and orders are the






43 days of its beginning, still in operational phase 1. Yet, the operational






were actually planning orders that by definition belonged to phase 2. The
problemwas that certaindecisive conditionsdefined in the LCO forphase1,
turnedouttobeverydifficulttoreachandthereforetheeffectiveLCO1hadnot
been terminated and theoperationhadnotbeenmovedonward tophase2
(defined inLCO2).Forexample,oneof thedecisiveconditionswas related to





locatedonbothsidesof theborder.This tribecurrentlybenefitted from legal
and illegal trade across the border and the operation lead was under the
impression that the closing of the border might result in a tribal offensive
against the BFOR forces. To cope with this possible development, it was
discussed whether border security should be defined inmore lax way. The
questionthereforewaswhetherthedocumentation(LCO1decisiveconditions)
or themilitaryaction (howBFORwas responding to theborder issue) should






problem for the assessment team. They felt that they could not fill the
requirementsset intheLCO1andthereforeonpapertheoperationcouldnot
bemoved toLCO2.Theassessment team leadercommented this to the team
saying:“Idonot like thesecriteria,but Idonotknowwhetherwecanchange
them”.Thediscrepancybetweenthepastfutureandthepresentfuturecreated
achallenge for the teamand in theambivalent situation theyoungerofficers
werepronetorevertto followingthetextsratherthanthesituationas itwas
perceived in themoment.  The LCO document held textual agency (Cooren,
2004)inthissituation:ithadstayingcapacityintheorganizationbyresistingits
reinterpretation. In thisway it guided and influenced the assessment team’s
work. Interestingly, Ihaddiscussed this situationwith the senior staff earlier
during the sameday. Ihadasked the LCCdeputy commander (DCOM)about
thiscaseandwhethertheunfillabledecisiveconditionsinthecurrentLCOcould
beredefined.Hehadansweredtome:“Offcourse,wehavedefinedtheearlier
command ourselves and therefore we have all the power to change its





the planning processes lagged, the ongoing game events reached them. This
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resulted inthesituationwheretheorderscouldnotbeclosed,butrathernew
events and knowledge requirements emerged continuously from various
parties, including the commander. In a sense, planning for future lost its
relevanceasthepresenteventscaughtupwith it.Planning for futurebecame
planning for present. Both the OTTM officers and the COS discussed this





This previous vignette shows how themilitary operation proceeds on three
interrelated temporal levels: future intents and ideas, present operational
needs and historical documents. These temporal levels have their own,
important roles in thework of the staff organization, and are connected in
various ways. The paper process, constituted of the orders defining the
operationalphases,wasmeant tostructureandpush theoperation forwards.
However,during thisexercise itbecamea force thathindered theprogressof
theoperation.Theorderdocument representeda ‘past future’andwhen the
currentoperationalrealityproduceda‘presentfuture’thatdifferedextensively
from theorder, it causeduncertainty and indecision in theorganization. The
stafforganization turned itseffort intoconforming thesediffering futuresand







reification practices solidify commitments of the various organizational
stakeholders and create the common grounds required in collaboration and
coordinated activity. However, in this case, the discrepanciesbetweenwhat
was planned in the past and how things unfolded currently in the operation
resultedinstrategicambiguityandcausedtheorderdefinitionactivityratherto
becomeapointofreversibility(Denisetal.,2011),wheretheLCO1becamean
objectof repeateddecisionmaking.  To solve theproblems related to LCO1,
multiplealternativeswereresearchedandproposed,andthearenasofdecision
making were reopened several times during the exercise. This collective
ambivalence and the widening scope of decision making prevented the
operation from moving forward and the operational present overtook the
planningofthefutureactivitiesresultinginamomentofinoperativenessinthe
organization.Accordingtoearlierresearch(Denisetal.,2011)itisespeciallythe
coexistence of these points of reversibility and irreversibility that creates a




The LCO1,whose fundamentwas to enhance the executionof theoperation
hadturned intoanagentof indecisionas itkepthinderingand inhibitingother
futureplanningprocessesandrequiringnewdecisionstobemadeaboutitself.
TheproblemswithLCO1required theorganizationalstakeholders toreturn to
its contents andmade itdifficult toproduce a stabledecision in thematter.
Furthermore,thedifferentinterpretationsheldintheorganizationoftheLCO1




according to the commanding officers’ interpretation, yet valuable time had




Iset the researchobjectiveof thispaper todiscoveringhow themilitarystaff
organizationleadsandorganizesitsfutureplanningactivitiesto‘keepaheadof
things in the battlespace’. I was interested in the social practices the
organization adopts in aiming to increase its situation awareness and the
challengesandproblems itfaces inthistask. Iappliedbothobjective i.e.clock
time and subjective i.e. constructed time readings on how temporalities are
involvedintheorganizingeffortduringthecrisismanagementexercise.

I described and analyzed three series of events from the exercise where
organizing, leadership and temporalities were linked. The first one of these




shared time and place for the organization members and helping them
synchronizetheiractivitiestothecyclical,dailybeatofthestafforganization.I
alsodescribedhow theCUBpracticebothcreates,manifestsandsustains the
leadership hierarchy in the organization via the symbolic role granting and
claimingperformancesgivenbytheleadersandfollowersduringthepractice.

Thesecondseriesofevents focusedonhoworganizingemerged inthe future
planning teams. Idiscussedhow thishappens linearly through time.First, the
individualsandtheirproximalteammemberscametotermsoftheirintrateam
organizingpracticesandworkrhythms.Second,thecomponentlevelintergroup
coordinationbegan toappearandmanyof the teammembers tookonnew,
supplementary roles in crossͲorganizational teams working on the land
component level. Finally, the focus turned to crossͲhierarchical cooperation
across BFOR, component and brigade levels. However, probably due to the
limited time frameof theexercise,on thecrossͲhierarchicalcooperation level
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the coordination practiceswere limited to the formal coordination practices
derivedfromthestandardoperatingprocedures(SOPs).Theredidnotseemto
beenough time for the teamsand teammembers tocreate informalworking
relationsacrosshierarchy levels thatwouldsupportmutualadjustmentof the
planningobjectivesandtheworktasksamongthemoredistantteams.Onthe
intrateam level and across teams within the land component, the informal
mutualadjustmenthademergedasacoordinatingmechanismanditsupported
the formalcoordinationmechanismsprovidedby theorganizationalhierarchy
and formaloperatingprocedures.Mutualadjustment, i.e. informalpersonͲtoͲ
person discussion and agreement on how a thing will be handled, is a
coordinationmechanism that isespecially important in the very simplestand
the most complex organizations (Mintzberg, 1979). The lack of mutual
adjustment across the organizational hierarchy showed how the formal
procedures and structures are not enough to get things done in an
organizationalsetting.AsCzarniawska(2013:22)hasargued,anorganizational
structure may facilitate organizational processes, but does not guarantee
anything.

Indeed, the second seriesofeventsalso showedhow the formal structureof
theorganizationactuallyhindered the intendedactivitiesof theorganization.
Themilitary staff organization follows the bureaucraticͲtayloristic organizing
principles.Worktasksarefunctionallyandhierarchicallysegregatedacrossthe
organization and coordinated following a classicalplanning schoolof thought
promoting sequentiality and irreversibility. The planning was supposed to
unfold following thewaterfallmodelofcoordination,wherehigher level tasks
wouldbe finished firstand theywould thenactas inputs for the lower level
tasks.However,thisorganizing logicwasnotworking inasatisfactory fashion,





emerged.Theoperational command tried to facilitate this confusionand find
wayswheretheoperationallogicprovidedbytheorganizationalstructurecould
be bypassed. Their ideas consisted of loosening from crossͲhierarchical
coordinationtointracomponentplanningcoordinationortweakingtheexercise
context to such a configuration where the current organizational structure
wouldworkbetter(i.e.starthigherlevelplanningsooner).Thesepracticalideas
are interesting inthesensethattheyhelpsolvetheemergentproblem inthis

11 Inaddition,evenwhenworking thewaterfallmodel isvery slow.The longplanningcycle
from the topof theorganization tobottom layersmay takeweeks.This isprobably far too
slow for contemporarymilitary campaigns,were the operational speed requirements have
increased tremendously because of technological innovations (Hanska, 2017). Therefore,
concurrent planning models may be required to gain the upper hand through quicker
organizationalreactiontimes.
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exercise or in the future exercise, but do not challenge organizational
configurationperse.Myobservationwasthattheorganizationanditsmembers
were deeply dedicated to the military staff organization configuration. The
paradox in the issue lies in the fact that the military staff organization is




principles stillsuit thecontemporaryneedsofmilitary stafforganizations, the




The third seriesof events focusedon thediscrepancybetween apast future
(represented in formal documents, i.e. orders) and a present future
(representedinthecurrentoperationalactivities).Theuncertaintywhetherthe
criteriaforthedecisiveconditionsdefinedinthepastcouldberedefinedtosuit







saw the challenges caused by continuous reversibility: the organization also
faced a situationwhere the orderswere not finalized but tweaked over and







its control across both space and time.Not only does itwant to control the
various geographical regions in Bogaland now, it also wants to know and
influence what happens to Bogaland in the future. Assuming this control
effectivelyisthechallengethestafforganizationfaces.Thestafforganizationis
a functionalorganization;withhighlyspecializedcomponents,unitandteams.
Temporally, thevariousunitscater tobothdifferentoperationalrhythms (e.g.
slowvs.quicktasks)andtodifferentfutureorientations(present,nearfuture,
distant future).Furthermore, to succeed theorganizationneeds toeffectively

12 For example, the Agile Management movement that was developed in software
developmentcontext.
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coordinate the activitiesof theseunits. This coordination ismanaged via the
organizational hierarchy and the standard operating procedures but also









military threat. Yet, during the exercise situations emerged where the
productionplanninglogicwasnotworkingfortheorganization.Astimepasses,
certain endͲstates may lose their relevance and become redundant.




it a success. Beta changes refer to situations where the criteria of success
changeduring theendeavor:westarted towards thatgoal,butaswe learned
more,we found out another goal suited our needs better. Gamma changes
refertoparadigmchanges,wherethewholeframeofreferenceforsuccessor
the identity of the change agent changes: success is not for example about
beating our enemies but about securing peace in the region. The CJSE
organizationhasbeendesignedtohandlealpha levelchangeeffortsverywell.
However, as depicted in the third empirical vignette, the organization is less
prepared to handle beta level change efforts, not tomention gamma level
change processes.My view is that this relates to the industrial organization
‘DNA’ dominating the staff organization with its focus on closedͲsystem
problems where standard solutions can be provided for the challenges the
organizationfaces.

I argued in the previous paragraph that the staff organization’s primary
temporalorientationwastowardsthefuture.Thisorientationwasvisibleinthe
organizationaleffortthatwasput intomanagingthedifferentfuturetemporal
frames.Pastevolutionpathof theoperation stayedhidden in theoperations
andthesocialpracticesduringtheexercise.Icouldspotonlyoneorganizational
routine procedure that explicitly took the past into consideration; the
assessment.Yet,theassessmentprocedurewasbuiltona linearalphachange
understanding of the relationship between the past,present and future. The
assessmenttoolseemedbeconstitutedofarathercrudeprojectmanagement
aid which does not recognize that future plans (i.e. objectives and means
created for organizational plans) have only a limited role in recognizing how
development paths actually unfold (i.e. experiences of lived organizational
processes)(Bullock&Batten,1985).Furthermore,duringtheexerciseIdidnot
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witness a single presentation or a report thatwould have tracked how the
operationhadunfolded in the simulated ‘real life’.Theoperational focuswas
alwaysonthenextstep.Thisshorteningoftheframeofoperationalreferenceis
partly due to the exercise context.We have to remember that the exercise
lastedonlyforaweek,andtheparticipantshadonlylimitedpossibilitytoorient
towardsthesimulatedsituation.Ziller(1965)suggestedthatmembers inopen
groups (where themembership isunstable)will tend tohaveshortͲterm time
perspectives in regard to group affairs, whereas closed groups (those with
stable memberships) will tend to have longerͲterm time perspectives.
Moreover, because of the setting the participants are both enforced and
encouragedtofocusontheir immediatetaskratherthandrifttheirawareness








military staff organizationmay be losing a lot of potential in reaching better
situation awareness: having amore comprehensive view of the history and
development path of the organization could provide for more convincing
prognosesof thepotential futures.Again,weneed topay attention that the
‘thoroughfocusingonthenearfuture’maybeduetothefastͲpacedandshort
exercisecontext. Itmaybe thatexperiencedstaffofficerswhoareworking in
Afghanistanforanextendedperiodoftime,arebetterequippedtodiscernboth
repeated actions and anomalies in the progress of the campaign. Yet, rather
thanfocusonindividualcapabilitiesortheofficers’personaltimeperspectives,I




very well support a learning orientation or a reflexive stance among the
participants.However,suchpracticeswerepresentduringtheexercise,yetthey
were included as ‘supplementary leadershippractices’ rather than as integral
elementsoftheorganizationstructure.BoththeLCCcommandingofficersand
theOTTM embraced the training dimension of the exercise. They repeatedly
encouraged the exercise participants to reflect on the events and kept the
issueson the genericagenda.The teamsheldbriefswere learningobjectives
andachievementswerediscussed.TheLCCchiefofstaffheldanexcellenttalk
onthethirddayoftheexerciseonhowtheorganizinghadunfoldedandwhat
the participants should look for next. The deputy commander held a DDT
(Design,Develop,Test)sessionforacrossͲorganizationalplanningparty,where
the discussion among the senior and junior officers was remarkably
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unhierarchical13. Still, these discussions related to learning focused on the
individualratherthanorganizationallearning.

Therefore, the senior officers encouraged the junior officers to become
reflective and proactive in their organizational roles. They emphasized the
learningaspectoftheexerciseandexplicatedthelearningobjectiveofacquiring
situation awareness capabilities. Yet, themajority of the junior officerswere
more occupied with understanding their primary task in the exercise and
expected the organization to operate smoothly as depicted in the SOPs.
According to my interpretation, many people had a rather idealized
understandingofthestafforganizationanditsoperation:peopleexpectedalot
from theorganization.When theorganizationdidnotwork immediatelyas it






activity. A famous quote14 is cited to US president Dwight Eisenhower who
stated the idea on several occasions: “Plans are worthless, but planning is
essential.”Theessenceof thisquotecanbewitnessed in theactivitiesof the
military staff organization. The planning activity; the social practices through
which it is organized, i.e. the collection and analysis of external and internal
information,thecreationofobjectivesandgoals,theassessmentofresources
and means, are what creates and maintains the organizational situation
awareness. In order to ‘keep ahead of things’, the organization needs to
constantlyengage inthethingsathand,thingsthatcanbe lurkingaroundthe
corner,andon the things thathave justpassed. These ideas,challengesand
risksarethenputintowordsonpaper,someofwhicharefurtherreificatedas
orderstobeusedasthebasesofcollectiveaction.However,wheneveraplan
materializes on paper, it starts to lose its relevance. And yet, in complex,
dynamic and ambivalent organizational settings, people can easily seek and
revert to the tangible things, such as plans, for concreteness and security.







13 In thissession Iwasdrawn to thediscussionwhen theDCOMasked“Whatwouldbe the
researcher’schoiceofoffensivemaneuverinthissituation?”.
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